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COMMENTARY
Noninsured Death Benefits for Employees-An
Unintended Fringe Benefit of the Goldsmith Case
MARCUS D. GRAYCK*
INTRODUCTION

As a practical matter, under Section 101(a) of the Code,' life insurance companies have enjoyed a virtual strangelehold on providing death benefits for employees. This near monopoly results from
the grant in Section 101(a) of a full exclusion from gross income of
the beneficiary for "amounts received . . . under a life insurance

contract."2 The broad Section 101(a) exclusion for insured benefits,
coupled with a limited $5,000 gross income exclusion of Section
101(b) of the Code for noninsured amounts that are paid by the
employer by reason of the employee's death,$ has stifled employer
self-funding of employee death benefits. Nevertheless, the recent
case of Goldsmith v. United States,' bulwarked by two cases that
* Partner, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, Illinois, and member of the Adjunct Faculty,
Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.A., Brooklyn College, 1948; Ll.B., Harvard
Law School, 1951; LI.M. (in Taxation), New York University School of Law, 1958.
1. All references to "Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
2. Section 101(a)(1) of the Code provides in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise provided ... gross income does not include amounts received (whether in a single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are paid by reason of the death of
the insured." This general rule is subject to § 101(a)(2) in the case of a transfer of a life
insurance policy for a valuable consideration. In that case, the amount of death benefits
excluded from gross income "shall not exceed an amount equal to the sum of the actual
value of such consideration and the premiums and other amounts subsequently paid by the
transferee."
3. Section 101(b) of the Code provides in pertinent part:
Gross income does not include amounts received (whether in a single sum or
otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the estate of an employee, if such amounts are
paid by or on behalf of an employer and are paid by reason of the death of the
employee.

The aggregate amounts excludable . . . with respect to the death of any employee shall not exceed $5,000.
4. 78-1 U.S.T.C. 19312 (Tr. J. opinion Ct. Cl. 1978). The Trial Judge's opinion was
adopted by the Court of Claims, 586 F,2d 810 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
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previously had chipped away at the ins.rance companies' lock on
Section 101(a), indicates that the balance may be shifting in favor
of employer self-funding of employee death benefits.
In analyzing the problems involved in providing noninsured
death benefits to employees, this article initially examines the taxexempt trust under Section 501(c)(9) of the Code,5 which is the
most likely vehicle for providing self-funded employee 'death benefits. Next, focus is shifted to the decisions that antedate the Goldsmith case. Finally, the "economic benefit" facet of the Goldsmith
case and its impact on employer self-funding of death benefits will
be considered.
SECTION

501(c)(9)

TRUST

Generally, Section 501(a) of the Code exempts from income tax
organizations described in Section 501(c) of the Code. Section
501(c) (9) of the Code allows for the establishment of a trust to provide "life, sick, accident or other benefits" for employees.7 This
provision has been utilized by employers principally to provide
self-funded hospital, medical and accident benefits for employees.
By self-funding, the basic risk for payment of benefits lies with the
employer rather than with the insurance company. Under a
501(c)(9) trust, actuarially determined funds are paid into a trust.
Hospital, medical and accident benefits are paid from this trust to
the employees.5 Typically, because of the limiting provisions of
Section 101(a) of the Code, employers have steered clear of providing self-funded death benefits for employees by means of a Section
501(c)(9) trust.9 Nevertheless, if there is to be a shift to providing

5.
6.
7.

See note 7 infra.
I.R.C. § 501(a).
Section 501(c)(9) of the Code provides in pertinent part:
Voluntary employees' beneficiary associations providing for the payment of life,
sick, accident, or other benefits to the members of such association or their dependents or designated beneficiaries, if no part of the net earnings of such association
inures (other than through such payments) to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
8. In a § 501(c)(9) trust, an employer may utilize a combination of self-funding and insurance. For example, the employer could self fund to pay any medical benefits up to
$50,000 for an individual in a single year; the amount in excess of $50,000 would be paid by
the insurance company.
9. The benefit to an employer providing self-funding is that the employer is not paying
for someone else (the insurance company) to insure the risk. In addition, state and local
premium taxes may be avoided by self-funding. Further, the interest earned by the trust
accumulates tax-free and inures to the benefit of the trust, which in turn, reduces the employer's contributions. When premiums are paid to the insurance company, that company
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self-funded death benefits for employees, employers probably will
turn to the 501(c)(9) trust as the vehicle for providing such
benefits.
The proposed regulations are helpful in interpreting the base
statutory language of Section 501(c)(9). 10 Proposed regulation 1.
501(c)(9)-2(a)(2) prohibits the limitation of membership in a Section 501(c)(9) trust to "officers, shareholders or highly compensated employees. . ."I' Thus, if an employer were to establish a
new Section 501(c)(9) trust solely to provide self-funded death
.

benefits for a select and highly compensated group of its executives, it is clear that this regulatory requirement would be violated.
However, such a new Section 501(c)(9) trust, together with any
other pre-existing employer-created broad base Section 501(c)(9)
trust already providing welfare benefits to a nondiscriminatory
classification of employees might be viewed by the Service as constituting a single Section 501(c)(9) trust.
There is no direct precedent or administrative interpretation on
whether the Service will view several Section 501(c)(9) trusts as a
single trust. Nevertheless, in the related field of pension and
profit-sharing trusts, qualified under Section 401(a)1 ' and also exempt under Section 501(a), "[a]n employer may designate several
trusts or a trust or trusts . . . as constituting one plan which is
intended to" meet the nondiscriminatory eligibility requirements
of Section 401(a)(3). 13 Though the two situations are analogous, if

has the use of the employer's money. The employer receives a dividend that reflects the
insurance company's expenses and assumption of the risk. Self-funding could be particularly
risky for small companies where large year to year fluctuations in mortality could occur.
This risk, however, could be minimized by a combination of self-funding and insurance. See
note 8 supra.
10. At present, no final regulations to § 501(c)(9) of the Code exist.
11. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 139 (1980). (All Fed. Reg.
cites to be codified in 26 C.F.R. Part I).
12. Section 401(a) of the Code gives the requirements for qualification of a pension,
profit-sharing and stock-bonus plan. See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Treas. Reg. 1.401-3(f), T.D. 7134, 1971-2 C.B. 200. Section 401(a)(3) of the Code
refers to § 410 which sets the broad base requirements for a qualified trust. Section 410(b)
states in pertinent part:
(1) . . . A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under section 401(a) unless the trust, or two or more trusts, or the trust or trusts and annuity plan or
plans are designated by the employer as constituting parts of a plan intended to
qualify under Section 401(a) which benefits either (A) 70 percent or more of all employees, or 80 percent or more of all the employees who are eligible to benefit under the plan if 70 percent or more of all the
employees are eligible to benefit under the plan, excluding in each case employees
who have not satisfied the minimum age and service requirements, if any, pre-
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an employer were to establish a new Section 501(c)(9) trust to provide self-funded discriminatory death benefits, it may be prudent
to obtain a ruling, assuring that the Service will view such a new
Section 501(c)(9) trust, and any broad base pre-existing Section
501(c)(9) trust as constituting a single Section 501(c)(9) trust for
the purpose of meeting the nondiscriminatory requirements of
Proposed Regulation 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(2). On the other hand, if selffunded discriminatory death benefits for executives were to be provided under a pre-existing broad base Section 501(c)(9) trust, presumably, there would be no difficulty in meeting the regulatory requirement that membership not be limited to "officers,
shareholders or highly compensated employees.... 1114
Not only must a Section 501(c)(9) trust be relatively chaste from
discriminating as to membership, it also must not discriminate
among its members as to benefits. The proposed regulations provide that a Section 501(c)(9) trust may provide life benefits, including life insurance benefits,1 5 and that "[n]o part of the net
earnings of an employees' association may inure to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual. . . . [Tihe payment to
highly compensated personnel of benefits that are disproportionate in relation to benefits received by other members of the association will constitute prohibited inurement."16
Though this regulatory provision is couched in terms of "disproportionate benefits", a Section 501(c)(9) trust may be protected
from attack by showing that either "contributions" to the trust or
"benefits" from the trust are not disproportionate. There is no precedent or interpretation directly on point on this question. Never-

scribed by the plan as a condition of participation, or
(B) such employees as qualify under a classification set up by the employer
and found by the Secretary not to be discriminatory in favor of employees who are
officers, shareholders, or highly compensated.
(Emphasis added). See Rev. Rul. 70-200, 1970-1 C.B. 101. Note that the language in §
410(b)(1) provides that one may elect to consider two or more trusts as a single trust to
meet the nondiscrimination requirement. Arguably, the same standard could exist under
501(c)(9). The § 410(b)(1) nondiscriminatory eligibility standard has been extended outside
the pension and profit-sharing area to cafeteria plans. I.R.C. § 125(g)(3)(A).
14. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(a)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 139 (1980).
15. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-3(a) provides in pertinent part: "The life, sick,
accident, or other benefits provided by a voluntary employees' beneficiary association must
be payable to its members, their dependents, or their designated beneficiaries.... Life,
sick, accident, or other benefits may take the form of cash or noncash benefits." 45 Fed.
Reg. 139 (1980).
16. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-4(a) and (b), 45 Fed. Reg. 139 (1980) (emphasis
added).
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theless, in the related field of qualified pension and profit-sharing
trusts, Section 401(a)(4) provides that a pension or profit-sharing
trust shall be qualified "if the contributions or benefits provided
under the plan do not discriminate in favor of employees who
are-(A) officers, (B) shareholders, or (C) highly compensated." 17
By analogy, it appears reasonable to expect that the standards of
Section 401(a)(4), i.e., "contributions or benefits," should also be
applicable in testing for disproportionateness under Proposed Regulation 1.501(c)(9)-4(b).
In view of the proposed regulatory stricture against disproportionate benefits, an employer should consider undertaking a statistical study to ascertain whether, in providing disproportionate
death benefits for executives, either contributions or benefits will
be nondiscriminatory in relation to compensation. Thereafter, and
with the results of such a study showing, for instance, that contributions for all provided benefits for various categories of employees bears a uniform percentage to compensation, it would be appropriate to make application to the Service for a ruling that the
total package of Section 501(c)(9) benefits is free from taint as being disproportionate in favor of highly compensated employees.18
Assuming that contributions to a Section 501(c)(9) trust, together with any other remuneration paid to the executives, is reasonable, an employer would be entitled to deduct the contributions
pursuant to Section 162(a)(1) as "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered." What would be the consequences to the employees covered
by such a trust? If employees receive current death benefit protection from the trust, will they be required to include in their gross
income the actuarially determined cost of such death benefit pro17. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4). E.g., Comm'r v. Pepsi-Cola-Niagara Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d 390
(2d Cir. 1968); P.F. Mitchell Corp. v. Comm'r, 27 TCM 1030 (1968); Rev. Rul. 70-200, 19701 C.B. 101, distinguished by Rev. Rul. 74-255, 1974-1 C.B. 93. See I.R.C. § 411(d)1 which
provides in pertinent part:
A plan which satisfies the requirements of this section shall be treated as satisfying any vesting requirements resulting from the application of Section 401(a)(4)
unless (B) there have been, or there is reason to believe there will be, an accrual of
benefits or forfeitures tending to discriminate in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, or highly compensated.
18. In the pension and profit-sharing sections of the Code, there is no discriminatory
result, i.e., no disproportionateness, if, in accordance with § 401(a)(5), "the contributions or
benefits of or on behalf of the employees under the plan bear a uniform relationship to the
total compensation, or the basic or regular rate of compensation, of such employees .... "

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 11

tection? In this regard, the proposed regulation provides:
(a) In general. Cash and noncash benefits realized by a person
on account of the activities of an organization described in section
501(c)(9) shall be included in gross income to the extent provided
in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, including, but not limited
to, sections 61, 72, 101, 104 and 105 of the Code and regulations
thereunder. 9
Is the provision of an employer-funded death benefit to an employee by a Section 501(c)(9) trust a noncash life benefit under the
proposed regulation so as to result in the value of such benefit being included in the employee's gross income? One could argue that
the provision of such a pre-retirement death benefit, in the absence
of a policy of life insurance, is a "naked" promise and, therefore,
not includible. There appears to be no direct authority on point.
Nevertheless, I submit that the Service cannot have it both ways;
that is, on the one hand, the Service cannot validly maintain that
an employee must include in his income the value of his death
benefit protection (as would be the case if a life insurance policy
were issued) and, on the other hand, maintain that the death benefit payment may not be excluded from the beneficiary's gross income under Section 101(a) of the Code. Three court decisions lend
support to this position.
ODOM AND DAVIS CASES
Upon the death of an employee, let us assume that the proposed
Section 501(c)(9) trust would make payment of a death benefit to
the employee's beneficiary. As already stated, Section 101(a) of the
Code would entitle a beneficiary to exclude from his gross income
such a death benefit payment if the payment is "under a life insurance contract." Two cases, Ross v. Odom20 and Davis v. United
States,21 have dealt with a taxpayer's contention that noninsured
death benefit payments are, nevertheless, amounts received "under
a life insurance contract." As stated at the outset of the majority
opinion in Ross v. Odom, the issue faced by the court
was, "When
22
is a no contract a contract? That is the question.
The taxpayer in Odom was the widow of a deceased employee of
the State of Georgia. The deceased was covered by the Georgia Re-

19.
20.
21.
22.

Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-6(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 139 (1980).
401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).
323 F. Supp. 858 (D.W. Va. 1971).
401 F.2d at 465.

1980J

Noninsured Death Benefits for Employees

tirement Plan. The Plan had been amended eight years prior to
the employee's death so as to provide a survivor's benefit program
for the payment of a death benefit to the deceased's widow. The
deceased had made monthly contributions toward the survivor's
benefit program and the State of Georgia made matching contributions for this program. The death benefit, under the survivor's benefit program, was not funded or insured by an independent insurance company. However, the court found that operation of the
program had many similarities to insurance. The survivor's benefit
program made use of an actuary in promulgating tables, rates and
regulations and, after six years' experience with the program,
death benefits were increased because of the success of the program and the adequacy of the actuarial computations. The court
held that the noninsured death benefits were benefits excludable
from gross income under Section 101(a) of the Code. It rejected the
Service's argument that an insurance contract with an independent
insurance company must be in existence for the exclusion under
Section 101(a) to apply."3
23.

The court stated:
This case is one of first impression and the precedents as to what constitutes
"amounts received under an insurance contract... paid by reason of the death of
the insured" are meager. Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 7.03 (1962). But all
cases which have had to discuss the problem are in agreement that for a monetary
benefit paid to survivors to come within the purview of § 101(a)(1), the "insurance
agreement need not be in the form of the standard life insurance contract." Mary
Tighe, 1959, 33 T.C. 557, 564. And, as the cases reflect, the arrangement need not
even be in the form of a traditional bilateral agreement, or for that matter, even a
unilateral one signed by one party and accepted by the other. Instead, for tax
purposes the critical factors in determining when the payment of death benefits
constitutes insurance have historically been the presence in a binding arrangement
of risk-shifting and risk distribution. Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539, 61
S.Ct. 646, 649, 85 L.Ed. 966, 999 (1941). This involves the payment of premiums
or assessments by a number of individuals into a common fund out of which the
payor's estate or beneficiaries will be paid a certain amount upon his death regardless of whether the amount is more or less than the decedent has paid into
the fund." Mary Tighe, supra, 33 T.C. at 564.
The concept of risk-shifting and risk-distribution was further explained in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Treganowan, supra, 183 F.2d at 291: "'Risk
shifting emphasizes the individual aspect of insurance: the effecting of a contract
between the insurer and the insured each of whom gamble on the time the latter
will die. Risk distribution, on the other hand, emphasizes the broader, social aspect of insurance as a method of dispelling the danger of the potential loss by
spreading its cost throughout the group. . . .' Note, The New York Stock Exchange Gratuity Fund: Insurance That Isn't Insurance, 59 Yale L.J. 780, 784."
In light of these general principles that have been developed over the years in
considering life insurance both under the present § 101 and its predecessor and
the estate tax provisions relating to insurance, we fully approve the Trial Court's
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In the Davis case, involving the West Virginia Judges' Retirement Fund, the taxpayer advanced an argument similar to the taxpayer in Odom. The court, however, held that the noninsured
death benefits were not excludable under Section 101(a) of the
Code. It found that "the West Virginia Plan fails to meet the criteria to qualify as a life insurance arrangement comparable to that
which was considered by the court in the Odom case."" Specifically, in contrast to Odom, there was no actuarially determinable
death benefit in Davis. 5
Ross v. Odom and, to a lesser degree, Davis, stand for the proposition that noninsured death benefit payments may, nevertheless, be amounts received "under a life insurance contract." As
such, these cases tend to support the argument that if a Section
501(c)(9) trust were to provide self-funded death benefits for employees, and if, under such a trust, there were both actuarially
sound "risk-shifting" and "risk distribution", the Section 101(a)
exclusion would apply. Under such circumstances, the payments
from the trust, though noninsured, would represent amounts received "under a life insurance contract."
Success with such an argument, though, should also bring the
corollary result that employees, also, cannot have it both ways.
Thus, I submit, on the one hand, an employee cannot validly argue
in favor of death benefit payments from a Section 501(c)(9) trust
being excludable under Section 101(a) of the Code as amounts
"under a life insurance contract" and, on the other hand, maintain
that all he has during his lifetime is a "naked" promise. Clearly, if
the death benefit proceeds are excludable, the employee should
also be required to include in his income the value of the "life insurance" protection provided him by the Section 501(c)(9) trust.
holding that the $27,450 received by taxpayer from the Georgia Survivors' Benefit
Program constituted amounts received under a life insurance contract.
Id. at 466-67 (footnotes omitted).
24. 323 F. Supp. at 862.
25. In reaching its conclusion, the court stated:
It is clear, of course, that under the West Virginia plan if there is no surviving
widow then there is no death benefit payable to anyone. In addition to the patent
lack of actuarial soundness of the Fund, this lack of a definitely determinable
death benefit is fatal to the plaintiff's position in this case. Absent a definite benefit payable in any event upon the death of the employee, there is no shifting of
risks, and, therefore, no insurance. As stated by the witness Friend, "I have never
come across a program, a death insurance program, where a death insurance
amount was not paid in the absence of a beneficiary."
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Though, in the past, logic may have dictated these results, today
the holding in Goldsmith v. United States on the economic benefit
doctrine provides increased impetus for the supposition that a Section 501(c)(9) trust's provision of uninsured death benefits, meeting the tests set forth in Ross v. Odom, results in payment of
amounts "under a life insurance contract" for the purposes of Section 101(a) of the Code.
GOLDSMITH CASE

Dr. Goldsmith was an anesthesiologist at a hospital under an
agreement executed in 1966. This agreement provided that Dr.
Goldsmith was entitled to receive as current compensation ninety
percent of his monthly billings. In 1969, Dr. Goldsmith and the
hospital entered into a deferred compensation agreement under
which specified retirement, severance, disability, death and accidental death benefits were payable. The agreement also provided
that the hospital had "no obligation to set aside, earmark or entrust any fund or money with which to pay its obligations. 2 6 Indeed, the agreement provided that Dr. Goldsmith would be a mere
general creditor of the hospital with respect to unpaid benefits
under the agreement. Nevertheless, the hospital reserved the right
to fund its obligations under the agreement and, in fact, the hospital did so by means of purchasing as its own property an endowment insurance policy on the life of Dr. Goldsmith for a monthly
premium of $450. Clearly not by coincidence, Dr. Goldsmith's
monthly compensation was reduced by $450 after the issuance of
the policy. Again, not by coincidence, the benefits under the hospital-owned policy matched the full package of benefits promised to
Dr. Goldsmith in his deferred compensation agreement.
Under both the constructive receipt and economic benefit doctrines, the Service sought to currently tax Dr. Goldsmith
with-and not permit deferral of-the $450 each month that the
hospital paid to the insurance company. The Court of Claims rejected the Service's argument under the constructive receipt doctrine." Likewise, the Court of Claims rejected the Service's argu26. Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 814 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
27. This branch of the Goldsmith decision is not discussed in the text because it is not
relevant to the provision of noninsured death benefits to employees. For a discussion of the
issues in Goldsmith, including the constructive receipt doctrine, see Elkins, Casenote-Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810 (Ct. Cl. 1978), 33 T. LAW. 308 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Elkins]; Zonana, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation After the Revenue
Act of 1978, COMPENSATION PLAN. J. (February 1979). In the Elkins article, the author cites
the following description of constructive receipt:
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ment for inclusion of the full $450 per month premium payment
under the economic benefit doctrine. In rejecting, under the economic benefit doctrine, the Service's argument for inclusion of the
full $450 per month premium payment, the Court of Claims unbundled the benefits available to Dr. Goldsmith and concluded
that the economic benefit doctrine did not reach the retirement
and severance benefits provided to Dr. Goldsmith, but did require
including in his gross income the value of the disability, death and
accidental death benefits. The court reasoned that the portion of
the premium payment represented by retirement and severance
benefits, constituted nothing more than a nonassignable, naked
promise under the economic benefit doctrine."8
This portion of the court's holding is consistent with the announced position of the Service in Revenue Ruling 6 8 - 9 9 .'9 In this
Revenue Ruling, an employee had entered into an employment
agreement providing for pension payments under specified conditions. The employer obtained issuance of a life insurance policy on
the employee's life to insure that funds would be available to meet
its obligation to make the promised pension payments. All rights
to benefits under this insurance policy, as in Goldsmith, remained
the sole property of the employer and proceeds of the policy were

[A] taxpayer will be subject to tax upon an item of income if he has unfettered
control in determining when such items of income should be paid. . . This doctrine may be especially relevant to deferred compensation agreements that provide employees with an election to receive compensation currently or to defer the
payment of such compensation.
Elkins at 310 (quoting from 385 T. MNGM'T (BNA) A-3 (1975)).
According to Elkins, economic benefit generally occurs "when an employee has actually
received property or a promise that can be valued presently with reasonable exactitude."
Thus, economic benefit requires an actual receipt of property whereas constructive receipt
only requires power to "elicit" receipt. Elkins at 311.
28. In rejecting inclusion of the premium payment represented by retirement and severance benefits, the court stated:
The hospital's promises to pay retirement benefits and severance benefits would
come due 27 years in the future when the taxpayer reached 65. The promises were
not secured in any way. No trust or escrow was established granting the taxpayer
a current benefit or removing these deferred sums from the potential claims of the
hospital's other creditors, as was the case in E. T. Sproull v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 16 T.C. 244, 247-48 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th
Cir. 1952) and in example 4 of Rev. Rul. 60-31, supra, 1960-1 Cum.Bull. at 180.
Nor were these promises by the hospital represented by a note or other writing
delivered to the taxpayer, which he could sell or assign. See Wolfe v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8 T.C. 689, 701 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 170 F.2d 73
(9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 914, 69 S.Ct. 605, 93 L.Ed. 1078 (1949).
Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 820-21 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
29. 1968-1 C.B. 193.
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payable only to the employer. On the basis of these facts, the Service concluded in Revenue Ruling 68-99 that the employee was not
taxable on the pension amounts until the taxable year in which he
receives the pension payments. This conclusion was reached because payments under the insurance policy "did not result in the
receipt of income by the employee at the time the employer entered into the insurance contract since the transaction did not produce a present economic benefit to the employee." 3 0
In contrast to the holding that the economic benefit doctrine did
not reach the retirement and severance benefits, the Court of
Claims held in Goldsmith that the value of disability, death and
accidental death benefits were includible in Dr. Goldsmith's income for the years in which the premium payments were made. In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court of Claims reasoned:
It becomes quite clear that the promises of payment on death
or disability were the familiar undertakings of a life insurance
company, albeit made by a hospital. To the extent of these
promises, the deferred compensation agreement provided the taxpayer with a current economic benefit as valuable as comparable
promises by a life insurance company.
Valuation of the economic benefits conferred by the insurance
features of the hospital's promise is in principle easily accomplished with evidence of the cost of comparable commercial insurance, in this case the portion of the premium for the policy 1which
is attributable to its life insurance and disability features.
In concluding that Dr. Goldsmith was to be charged, for income
tax purposes, with the economic benefit afforded him against catastrophic loss (death, disability or accidental death), the Court of
Claims paralleled the theory behind the provisions of Section
72(m)(3) of the Code. Under this section, a participant in a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan is required to include in his
gross income the portion of plan assets, as determined under the
regulations, which is applied to purchase life insurance protection. 2 In effect, the plan participant is taxed as if he had received

30.
31.
32.

Id. at 194.
586 F.2d at 821-22.
Section 72(m)(3) provides in pertinent part:
(B) Any contribution to a plan described in subparagraph (A)(i) or a trust described in subparagraph (A)(ii) which is allowed as a deduction under Section 404,
and any income of a trust described in subparagraph (A)(ii), which is determined
in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary to have been applied to
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a current distribution of the cost of term life insurance protection
from the plan and applied the same for death benefit protection.
In much the same way, where contributions by an employer to a
Section 501(c)(9) trust are applied to provide death benefits for an
employee, under Goldsmith v. United States and the economic
benefit doctrine, the employee would be taxed with the value of
such protection.
CONCLUSION

Goldsmith v. United States complements Ross v. Odom in that
each decision deals with a separate side of the same coin. Ross v.
Odom, and, to a lesser degree, Davis v. United States, hold that
noninsured death benefit payments involving actuarially sound
"risk shifting" and "risk distribution" are amounts received
"under a life insurance contract." Goldsmith's holding completes
the picture in that it requires, on the basis of the economic benefit
doctrine, an employee to include in his income during his lifetime
the value of life insurance protection, even though the employee
and his beneficiaries have no interest in a life insurance policy. It
would appear that the provision of noninsured death benefits by
means of a Section 501(c)(9) trust and the attendant exclusion of
the death benefit proceeds under Section 101(a) of the Code may
now be supported by Goldsmith for that side of the coin not considered by Ross v. Odom.8

purchase the life insurance protection under a contract described in subparagraph
(A), is includible in the gross income of the participant for the taxable year when
so applied.
33. The Service appears to be unwilling to rule with respect to the side of the coin likely
to be more costly to it, i.e., the § 101(a) of the Code issue involving exclusion of the death
benefit proceeds. Yet on the other hand, it appears to be willing to concede the issue determined by the Court of Claims in the Service's favor in Goldsmith under the economic benefit doctrine. See Private Letter Rulings 7907092 and 7907088.
In Private Letter Ruling 7907088, which involved facts similar to Goldsmith (except for
taxpayer's representation that the deferred compensation plan did not involve either a salary reduction or a foregoing of an increase in salary), the Service ruled, citing Rev. Rul. 6899, 1968-1 C.B. 193, that "No income will be includible by a participant as a result of Employer's payment of premiums on one or more policies of insurance on his life, provided
Employer is both owner and beneficiary of such policies." Nevertheless, and quite tellingly,
the text of the letter ruling contains the following paragraph: "In a telephone conversation
with Mr. James Musselman of my staff on March 13, 1978, you withdrew the rulings you
requested concerning Section 691 and 101 of the Internal Revenue Code (rulings numbered
3 and 4 in your correspondence)."
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